Ehsan Salimi ghleie; Artin Jahanshahi; Hasan Mirzaei
Abstract
One of the ways to control and prevent crime is cyber filtering or content filtering. Filtering has been widely used in Iran. Applying filtering to prevent crime, along with the benefits it may bring, has its expenses and costs. In order To limit resources and avoid unwanted costs caused by filtering, ...
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One of the ways to control and prevent crime is cyber filtering or content filtering. Filtering has been widely used in Iran. Applying filtering to prevent crime, along with the benefits it may bring, has its expenses and costs. In order To limit resources and avoid unwanted costs caused by filtering, it is necessary to measure and evaluate the costs and benefits caused by filtering. In this regard, the present article aims to discuss filtering with the descriptive-analytical method and with the approach of economic analysis of law to "determine efficiency". In this way, the two main components of productivity, i.e. "efficiency" and "effectiveness" are the filtering evaluation indicators in this study. The findings of this research show that first; Content filtering, with all the high costs that imposed on the society for its implementation and as a result of its implementation, has had few benefits, so it does not have the necessary efficiency. Secondly; filtering lacks the expected and desired effectiveness for many technical and social reasons. The conclusion and theory of this article is that it is necessary to revise the current content filtering policies and use other methods of crime prevention in cyberspace.
Mahsa Robati; rahim pilvar; Hossien Javar
Abstract
Non-opposability is a sanction that came from French law to Iranian law and has taken examples in Iran's law, judicial procedure and legal doctrine. The flow of this sanction is where the rules protecting the rights of third parties, such as the need to register and publish or comply with the form, etc., ...
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Non-opposability is a sanction that came from French law to Iranian law and has taken examples in Iran's law, judicial procedure and legal doctrine. The flow of this sanction is where the rules protecting the rights of third parties, such as the need to register and publish or comply with the form, etc., in creating legal elements such as a contract, are not observed by the persons involved such as the parties to the contract. In Iranian law, this sanction is included among sanctions and legal situations such as nullity, lack of Influence and Mora’a and it raises the question that how efficient are these sanctions and legal situations for non-observance of the rules protecting the rights of third parties compared to non-opposability?Since efficiency is a basic concept in economics, which has several criteria for its evaluation, this research, using the efficiency evaluation criteria in economics, describes and analyzes the non-opposability from an economic point of view and in comparison with other sanctions and legal situations in Iran's laws.The result of this research is the economic efficiency of the non-opposability, among other sanctions in Iranian law, from the point of view of Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criteria, relation to the situation of non-compliance with the rules protecting the rights of third parties.
Jalil Ghanavati; yadollah dadgar; Mohammadali Rezapoor Akerdi
Abstract
Nowadays, consumer contracts, which contain a wide range of contracts, are made in the standard form predominantly. Despite their economic benefit, these contracts have bad result for the consumer, In such a way that the trader, with exploitation of his superior position, arrange an unfair contract to ...
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Nowadays, consumer contracts, which contain a wide range of contracts, are made in the standard form predominantly. Despite their economic benefit, these contracts have bad result for the consumer, In such a way that the trader, with exploitation of his superior position, arrange an unfair contract to his advantage and to the detriment of the consumer.The law can not be passive against this injustice but legal mechanisms to deal with unfair and one-sided terms of consumer contracts are inefficient, because that provisions, according to the neoclassic economics, believe that informational Asymmetry and Inequality are the main cause of unfair consumer contracts, And so, uses information disclosure strategies as the basic tool to solve the problem of unfair terms of consumer contracts, this approach need to be reviewed and changed. This new approach is taking the advantage of the findings of "behavioral law and economics". Accordingly, the main problem of consumer contracts lies not only in the information asymmetry between the consumer and the trader, but also in the consumer’s real perception and decision-making processes that are affected by cognitive biases and errors. in this article, we will show in a descriptive-analytical way that the EU law approach, which includes the most detailed and advanced regulations in this field, as well as the consumer protection regulations in Iranian law, are based on the information paradigm, derived from neoclassical economics insights and failed in fair and equitable consumer contracts conclusion.
Mohammad Taqi Rafiei; marziyeh zookinejad
Abstract
Introduction
The theory of Economic Analysis of law, sometimes interpreted as the theory of Law and Economics, is one of the important theories about the relationship between Law and Economic that first exposed to discuss in the United States and then in other countries in the second half of the 20th ...
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Introduction
The theory of Economic Analysis of law, sometimes interpreted as the theory of Law and Economics, is one of the important theories about the relationship between Law and Economic that first exposed to discuss in the United States and then in other countries in the second half of the 20th century. According to this theory, increasing economic efficiency and maximizing wealth are the basis for evaluation and the aim of the law. One of the issues increasingly has attracted economists and lawyers' attention in the information economy is privacy. Although there are different definitions of privacy, all of them are related to the boundaries between the self and the others or in fact between private and public. In this article in order to determine the optimal level of government intervention and to present a definitive economic assessment of whether more or less, privacy protection is required, we compare the aggregate values of privacy protection and disclosure of personal data (lack of privacy protection) and the economic implications of them by analyzing diverse streams of theoretical on the economics of privacy as well as privacy tradeoffs for data holder, data subjects, and third parties.
Methodology
The method for collecting information is a library method. We studied statutes, regulations, cases as well as articles and books about this topic. In this comparative study, the method of thinking is the descriptive-analytical method.
Results & Discussion
Chicago School's scholars believe privacy protection as the source of economic inefficiencies. The reasons for these inefficiencies also has expressed as follows: hiding information from other economic agents, increased transaction costs, hiding negative features, the difficulty of transaction risk analysis and fraud encouragement. It is also said that free information sharing leads to reduced market distortion, increased social welfare, and consumer interests from positive externalities of the second market. Finally, privacy protection depends on the valuation of the parties interested in certain data not on the regulatory protection of personal information. In criticizing this theory we can say that the assumptions of rational behavior (considering the current technologies) can't take into account the complexity of consumer's decision making. First of all, the consumer sometimes cannot predict the future effects of the current information sharing (for example, the negative externality of secondary market, price discrimination, utilization of data for unsolicited marketing and the other negative consumer externality that is not internalized by the firms). Second, at the time of choosing the short term benefits and the long term costs of information disclosure, the consumers do not act properly. Privacy also has a positive effect on welfare and efficient balance in source allocation. Moreover, in rejecting the theory of efficiency in the free flow of information we can say that such a system would be inefficient in the long term. Because information about an individual is never complete or accurate. If an individual has no control over the dissemination of her personal information, does not know what facts may determine a counterparty’s decision, and he can't correct errors in her record, that may lead to economically inefficient behavior by all parties to a transaction. Finally, people may not acquire privacy protection under standard market conditions due to poverty, transaction costs and other impedimenta.
Disclosed personal information (the lack of privacy protection) has economic benefits and costs for three groups of people: data holders, data subjects and third parties. disclosed personal information can bring about economic benefits for data holders (for instance, efficiency gains, price discrimination, increased revenues through consumer tracking, improved services or its redesigning with respect to consumer behavior); data subjects (for instance, discounts, personalization, sales of personal information with prophetization approach, targeted offers, reducing junk and telemarketing and increasing the reliability of gathered data, price discrimination, the advantages of secondary markets) and third parties(for instance, improve the experiences of third parties). At the same time, such disclosures can be costly for data holder (for instance, costs associated with data collection when consumers deem gathering method too intrusive or the costs associated with the use or misuse of collected data, such as privacy violations, the cost of informing consumers of a breach, termination of relationships with a company and reducing certain transactions because of fears of future privacy costs as well as costs associated with the act of collecting data such as the investments necessary to build Customer Relationship Management systems); data subject (for instance, the psychological costs including unpleasant feelings of being observed, Being afraid of invasion, the embarrassment due to disclosing data; identity theft; price discrimination; changing the balance of power between the data subject and the data holder; time costs including time spent deleting junk mail and even criminal charges) and third parties (for instance, disclosure of third parties' information and their privacy violations).
Similarly, protected personal information (privacy protection) has benefits and costs for data holders and data subjects that are often in inverse ratio to the benefits and costs of disclosed data. Privacy protection can lead to economic benefits for data holders (for instance, limiting responsibilities, gaining competitive advantage by attracting consumers who value for privacy) and data subjects (for instance, reducing the expected costs of future identity theft, the benefits arising from the seller's lack of awareness of some personal information). Also, privacy protection may include costs for data holders (for instance, opportunity costs such as the loss of opportunities for increased efficiency as well as the costs associated with the act of protecting data such as investments necessary for data encryption) and data subject (for instance, cognitive costs associated with getting informed from breach and response to a breach disclosure, opportunity costs for not using data in useful individual and social aims, as well costs associated with the act of protecting data including costs of using privacy enhancing technologies)
Conclusion & Suggestions
Considering the analysis presented, it was concluded that the meaning and scope of privacy, its associated trade-offs and consumer's valuations of personal data are very diverse. Furthermore, the benefits and costs arising from the protection of privacy and personal data sharing would be different depending on different circumstances, conditions and assumptions. Finally, economic theory also shows that as much as the interruption of data flows can decrease aggregate welfare, the protection of privacy can increase it. So, it would be difficult to compare the aggregate values of privacy protection and personal data and to present a final and definitive economic assessment of whether more or less, privacy protection is required. Therefore, it seems that solving the privacy problem means to find a balance between privacy and information sharing that is for the benefits of data subjects and society. Evaluating privacy from an economic perspective can help us to find this balance. Additional research is needed to find a way of creating such a balance in this area.
Esmat Golshani; Seyed Mahdi Hosseini Modarres
Abstract
Despite the time and accuracy that the lawmakers spend on enacting legislations; Issues such as the inability to anticipate all possibilities, changes and transformations in society after passing the laws, the requirements and possibilities arising from the use of words and linguistic issues, lawmakers ...
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Despite the time and accuracy that the lawmakers spend on enacting legislations; Issues such as the inability to anticipate all possibilities, changes and transformations in society after passing the laws, the requirements and possibilities arising from the use of words and linguistic issues, lawmakers potential for making mistakes and a host of other reasons lead to a situation in which that different inferences can be made of the text of legislation. In such situation interpretation and its governing rules and principles become important and philosophical views underlying each of the interpretive schools and techniques are set against one another; among these philosophical views, the contrast between economical interpretation approach and formalism approach is remarkable.
In this research, data is collected through library method and analysis of topics is being done by two methods: descriptive and analytical.
In this paper, first, a clear picture of the mentality of the founders and proponents of the two approaches has been provided then these two philosophical approaches to the interpretation of laws have been discussed and analyzed, and their contrasts and contradictions have been clarified. In conclusion, economic analysis of law on one hand and legal formalism on the other hand are in conflict at both theoretical practical aspect; at the theoretical aspect these two are different from each other in intellectual foundations, the debate over the claim of the perfection of law, and in the inferring of definite and similar result from text of law. At the practical aspect they use totally different methods for interpretation.
Mahdi Shahabi; Azadeh Masoudipour
Abstract
Economic analysis of law is a new approach in law that emerged in the early 1960's and its main purpose is managing the rules of the legal system in a way to achieve economic efficiency. This approach has been influential in all the areas of law including the law of civil liability and follows to set ...
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Economic analysis of law is a new approach in law that emerged in the early 1960's and its main purpose is managing the rules of the legal system in a way to achieve economic efficiency. This approach has been influential in all the areas of law including the law of civil liability and follows to set up the compensation system based on some principles to minimize the costs resulting from damages.
This paper first uses the analytical method and tries to describe the theoretical framework of the economic fault and afterward follows up to explain how it is emerged in the case law.
Economic analysis of civil liability law examines the basis of liability by using normative and positive approaches and evaluates the capability of each approach to obtain economic efficiency and at the end chooses the economical fault as the basis of liability from the viewpoint of both approaches; a choice that is able to prevent the undesirable consequences of strict liability on economy, hence the economic analysis of law leads to the revival of fault in the civil liability system.
Mohammad Abedi
Abstract
Penalty clause or liquidated damage which is formerly agreed between parties is legally examined and accepted as a rule. Although judge could in some circumstances modify this stipulation. Yet its economic analysis which is focused on economic efficiency can be considered as a “major unexplained puzzle ...
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Penalty clause or liquidated damage which is formerly agreed between parties is legally examined and accepted as a rule. Although judge could in some circumstances modify this stipulation. Yet its economic analysis which is focused on economic efficiency can be considered as a “major unexplained puzzle in the economic theory of law”.
This article compares the major legal systems in the case of penalty clause with the comparative method and analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of penalty clause with the descriptive and analytical research method.
This article tries to deeply appraise the invalidation of the penalty clause and introduce an intermediate solution penalty clause whit some exceptions in special circumstance, as a principle give rise to justice and economic efficiency.
